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Concepts of religion in debates on secularisation
Katarzyna zieliŃsKa
Defining the concept of religion is a recurring theme in the sociology of religion. Yet the con-stant attempts to determine the subject of the 
study do not necessarily indicate the immaturity of the 
discipline. The ongoing discussions are rather part of a 
broader problem, as the acceptance or rejection of cer-
tain understandings of the core concepts determines 
the scope of the discipline’s field. More importantly, 
it also permits other concepts to be understood, along 
with the social reality beyond them. Since the social 
reality is changing under the influence of various dy-
namics taking place in the contemporary globalised 
world, so should the conceptual apparatus aiming at 
describing those dynamics. This paper aims to grasp 
this changing nature of the central concept – that of re-
ligion. This is done through analysis of the debate on 
secularisation theories.  
Sociology of what? Struggling to define the subject 
Defining religion is a very difficult task, not only in 
the field of the sociology of religion but also in other 
disciplines dealing with this phenomenon (e.g. the 
philosophy of religion, religious studies). In the field 
of the sociology of religion difficulties with defin­
ing the subject of our studies can already be traced 
in the writings of the ‘founding fathers’ of sociology. 
Max Weber, at the beginning of his work on religion, 
claimed that the definition of religion can only be 
worked out at the end of a study, rather than at its 
outset (Weber 1978: 399). Émile Durkheim pointed 
to the limitations stemming from the cultural embed­
dedness of defining concepts, which are meant to be 
universal (Durkheim 2001: 25–6). Karl Marx, on the 
other hand, perceived religion as a product of alien­
ation which would disappear with the elimin ation of 
the conditions causing it (Marx and Engels 2008: 42).
Attempts to define the subject matter of the soci­
ology of religion were further complicated by the 
‘religious heritage’ of the discipline itself. Initially it 
was developed by religious institutions interested in 
understanding the changing nature of the religious 
practices of  European and American populations af­
ter World War II. The first sociological research on the 
condition of religion was mostly done under the aus­
pices of both the Catholic and Protestant Churches , 
which limited the scope of interest of the researchers 
(Schreuder 1966, Dobbelaere 1968). Hence, in this 
research religion was frequently understood in terms 
based on the particularity of Christianity and its spe­
cific institutional forms. Such a ‘religious heritage’ of 
the discipline became a subject of concern among the 
sociologists in the 1960s and the early 1970s. Discus­
sions focused not only on the need to secularise the 
discipline (Dobbelaere 2000: 435), but also pointed 
to the limitations of the concepts used in it, i.e. reli­
gion, religiosity, and secularisation (Robertson 1970, 
Luckmann 1963). 
In terms of the topic of this article, the discus­
sions on the concept of religion are of particular in­
terest. Initially, in the 1960s, the main theme was the 
problem of what today might be called the cultural 
embeddedness of the concept. Scholars pointed to 
the exclusive character of the definitions of religion 
based on the Christian peculiarities and their ethno­
centricity (Cohn and Klausner 1962: 25; Luckmann 
1963: 148). These early debates contributed to the 
attempts to redefine the concept and reach beyond 
the limitations imposed by Christian heri tage. They 
called for more inclusive definitions of religion. In 
this context Thomas Luckmann coined his defini­
tion of religion in which it is understood as ‘the 
transcendence of bio logical nature by the human 
organism’ (Luckmann 1967: 48). As a consequence, 
‘[f]rom the narrowly institutional, the notion of reli­
gion becomes quite simply part of being human; it 
is that which transcends biological nature’ (Davie 
1998: 148). Simi larly, James E. Dittes (1969) spoke 
of secular religion as a phenomenon characteristic 
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of modern societies, where religious elements may 
more likely be found in various spheres such as the 
family and politics than in the religious sphere. Will 
Herberg’s (1962) proposal of operationalised religion 
and Robert Bellah’s (1967) notion of civil religion can 
also be interpreted in this spirit. 
Deliberations on the subject of study continued in 
the 1970s. However, then they concentrated largely 
on the differences between substantial and functional 
definitions of religion. They focused respectively on 
defining religion in terms of the contents of the phe­
nomena pertaining to it, or in terms of its place and 
role in the social and/or psychological systems (Berg­
er 1974: 126), and on the applicability of those defini­
tions (Berger 1974, Luckmann 1977). Both types of 
definitions have their supporters and critics. Substan­
tive definitions are often accused of being culturally 
specific (King 1999 in Bruce 2011: 112; Dobbelaere 
2011: 193). On the other hand functional definitions 
are often perceived as too inclusive (Bruce 2011: 110; 
Dobbelaere 2011: 192), difficult to operationalize 
(Weigert 1974) and ideological (Berger 1974: 127). 
Reaching beyond the question of the usefulness and 
validity of both types of definitions, some scholars 
interpret these discussions as attempts to de­West­
ernise the sociology of religion and as enabling the 
inclusion of non­Christian religions in the field of the 
sociology of religion (Voyé 2004). 
Currently, the problem of defining the subject of 
the discipline seems still to persist in the sociology of 
religion (e.g. International Sociology Review, March 
2011). Yet constant attempts to determine the param­
eters of the subject do not necessarily indicate its im­
maturity. The ongoing discussions are rather part of 
a broader problem, as acceptance or rejection of cer­
tain understandings of the core concepts determines 
the scope of the discipline’s field. More importantly, it 
also permits other concepts to be understood, along 
with the social reality beyond them. Since the social 
reality is changing under the influence of various dy­
namics taking place in the contemporary globalised 
world, so should the conceptual apparatus aiming at 
describing those dynamics. However, we may ask the 
question: to what extent is this true?
This paper aims to grasp the changing notion of 
the central concept – that of religion. This is done 
through an analysis of the debates about secularisa­
tion theories which indicate well the widening focus 
of the sociology of religion as it aims to embrace 
changing social realities. 
Debates on secularisation – what are they about?
The question of secularisation as a theoretical model 
or a social reality seems to be a recurring theme in 
the sociology of religion. As early as the 1960s, when 
the initial theories were constructed, scholars in the 
field argued that the term was ideologically loaded 
(Martin 1965: 182). Not only was the usage of the 
concept criticised, but the existence of the seculari­
sation process itself was put in doubt (Greeley 1972: 
2–3). Despite all reservations, theories about secu­
larisation seemed to offer the best explanation for 
the religious transformations taking place in mod­
ern (Western) societies. With time those approaches 
were accepted by scholars in the field and widely used 
in interpretations of the observed changes regarding 
religion which were taking place in modern society.
Steadily, more and more empirical data showing 
the persistence, or resurgence, rather than weaken­
ing, of various religions started to challenge the as­
sumptions behind secularisation theories. The crucial 
moment from the point of view of an intensification 
of the debate was the emergence of the first articles 
presenting the arguments which outlined a theory of 
religious economy, as described by Rodney Stark and 
William Sims Bainbridge (1980). The new theory, in 
the opinion of its authors, would be better equipped 
to cope with the anomalous observations emanat­
ing from the USA, which were problematic from the 
point of view of secularisation theories. It was also 
supposed to offer better explanations for changes tak­
ing place in other parts of the world. 
Observations coming from around the world be­
came a further challenge to the assumptions of the 
secularisation paradigm. Particularly the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, the growth of the New Christian 
Right and the emergence of religious fundamental­
isms and radicalisms contradicted assumptions about 
the separation of religion from the public sphere and 
its privatisation (Casanova 1994, Shupe and Hadden 
1998). The third element contributing to the discus­
sion was a growing number of new religious move­
ments, as well as new forms of religion; phenomena 
particularly visible in Western Europe (Knoblauch 
2003). The old model was not able to deal success­
fully with these observations, which in Kuhnian lan­
guage could be called anomalies. Hence, it intensified 
a debate on the limitations of the old paradigm and 
the search for new approaches. 
The discussion in question embraces the most re­
cent theoretical and empirical developments in the 
sociology of religion, so the analysis of the arguments 
of the dispute will allow hidden assumptions and 
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limitations to the conceptual apparatus of the discip­
line to be revealed. In the following I will attempt 
to present the focus of these discussions and, more 
importantly, indicate what they say about the under­
standing of religion in the field. The analysis will be 
largely based on the works (i.e. academic journals, 
monographs and collections) published from 1980 
till 2006 – the period when the debate was in its most 
dynamic phase. Publications emerging after that date 
seem to rather recycle the existing arguments than 
add new dimensions to the discussion (e.g. Warner 
2010, Turner 2010).
Theoretical issues 
Critics of the secularisation thesis accused it of 
ideolo gism and dogmatism. In their view seculari­
sation theories are based on criticisms of religion 
stemming from the Enlightenment. The authors of 
those theor ies were supposed to be not only neutral 
scholars, but people directly involved in the strug­
gles between new secular and old religious orders 
(Hadden 1987: 590). As a consequence of this legacy 
the secularisation thesis was sacrificed, and the pro­
cess of secularisation began to be treated as evident, 
even without data supporting its persistence. The 
secularisation thesis was ‘never either rigorously ex­
amined or even formulated explicitly and systematic­
ally’ (Casanova 1994: 17). Answering these accusa­
tions, the defenders of the secularisation paradigm 
stressed that the first secularisation theories were try­
ing to explain the observable processes taking place 
on both sides of the Atlantic which were researched 
by the representa tives of ‘religious sociology’ (Helle­
mans 1998: 68; Berger 2001: 444). Therefore, in their 
view the secularisation thesis is not 
an ideology based on anti­religious 
sentiments, but the first attempt at 
developing a theory in the field of 
the sociology of religion, based on 
empirical data indicating the de­
cline of religious practices and the 
weakening position of the Chris­
tian Churches. 
Other areas of fervent discus­
sion concern attempts to define the 
secularisation process, predictions 
about the future of religion and 
the universality of the secularisa­
tion model. Striking are the dif­
ferences in the understanding of the phenomena of 
religion and secularisation between critics and sup­
porters of the secularisation approach. The authors of 
the rational choice theory of religion – the principal 
critics of the secularisation thesis – define religion 
as the individual’s choice and experience. Therefore, 
secularisation is seen as the effect of a change at the 
individual level and something which concerns indi­
vidual beliefs, values, affiliations, practices and reli­
gious rites (Stark and Bainbridge 1981, Stark 1999). 
They tend to see secularisation as the disappearance 
of religion at an individual level and – contrasting 
this claim with data on beliefs and practices of vari­
ous religions, including new religions – they show 
the inade quacy of the thesis. On the other hand, the 
defenders of the secularisation theory are mostly 
concerned with the societal location of religion and 
its power and strength. Consequently, they claim that 
the main focus of the secularisation process is at soci­
etal level (Bruce 2013: 2). It is
 a process by which the overarching and trans­
cendent religious system of old is being reduced 
in a modern functionally differentiated society 
to a subsystem alongside other subsystems, los­
ing in this process its overarching claims over 
the other subsystems. As a result, the societal 
significance of religion is greatly diminished 
(Dobbelaere 1999: 232).
So it is a social process with social differentiation at 
its heart. Despite the various stances on the condi­
tions and consequences of that differentiation among 
different scholars, they stress that changes at the in­
dividual level are only one possible consequence of 
the secularisation process (Wilson 1981, Dobbelaere 
1981, Chaves 1994) and that the data on individual 
religiosity cannot be treated as 
its only credible and apt measure. 
Philip Gorski argues that the iden­
tification of secularisation with 
its individual dimension means 
passing over its core assumptions 
and focusing on the peripheries of 
the secularisation thesis (Gorski 
2000: 142). Therefore, by focus­
ing on changes at the individual 
level critics ignore transformations 
at the societal level , in particular 
changes in the relations between 
religion and other social institu­
tions (Chaves 1994: 759). 
Discussions also focus on the question of the fu­
ture of religion in modern and postmodern societies. 
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Opponents of secularisation theories claim that these 
theories see the future of religion as a linear process 
which involves an unavoidable disappearance of vari­
ous aspects of religion (Warner 1993). The seculari­
sation process is ‘an irreversible trend that will, soon­
er or later, spell the end of religion and of religious 
organisations as a significant factor in advanced soci­
eties’ (Stark and Bainbridge 1981: 161). Alternatively, 
they propose redefinition of the relationship between 
religion and modernity and argue for seeing cur­
rent developments as either a transformation of reli­
gion or a cyclical decline and resurgence of religion. 
The latter argument suggests that secularisation is a 
self­limiting process, initiating religious resurgence 
(Stark and Bainbridge 1981: 362). The former stand­
point claims that modernisation transforms religion, 
initiating the emergence of new religions or a trans­
formation of those that already exist (Crippen 1988: 
332). 
Answering both these claims, supporters of the 
secularisation thesis stress that in most secularisa­
tion theories the process in question is not presented 
as linear. Its patterns should be rather described as 
cyclical/spiral, dialectical, and paradoxical and ones 
which assume simultaneous occurrences of seculari­
sation and sacralisation (Goldstein 2009: 158). The 
secularisation process is ‘not universal, but context 
dependent and therefore often non­linear’ (Pickel 
2011: 4). Moreover, the critics do not seem suffi­
ciently to take into account the societal dimension 
and the role of new religions in social life (Lechner 
1991: 1112). Even if new gods emerge, they will not 
have an analogous influence on social life as that of 
the old gods. 
The analysis of the arguments of both sides allows 
for interesting observations regarding the under­
standing of religion. The defenders of secularisation 
theory seem in their claims to equate religion with its 
Christian forms. This is suggested by both the geneal­
ogy of secularisation theory (i.e. the European experi­
ence of Christianity) and by stressing the societal 
dimension of religion (i.e. the experience of the dom­
inant Churches in the European context). The cases 
used by the critics imply broader understandings of 
religion including both old Christian Churches and 
denominations and new, individualised forms. Reli­
gion is changing its form and functions. 
Empirical data as a challenge to the secularisation 
thesis’s claims 
The debate on secularisation became particularly 
fierce when more and more data and observations 
started to contradict the predictions of the seculari­
sation thesis. Analysis of the arguments used by both 
sides allows us to uncover the normative assumptions 
regarding religion on both sides of the discussion.
Age of piety?
The ‘age of piety’ is perceived as a period of time in 
European history when Christianity maintained a 
strong position, and is often used by secularisation 
theories as a contrast to modern times. In other 
words, it is often presented as a starting point for the 
process of secularisation. Critics of the secularisation 
thesis point to new historical research and stress that 
there was no period of time when religion dominated 
and the majority of the population was religious or 
practising (Brown 1992: 38; Swatos and Christiano 
1999: 220). As Stark comments:
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Everyone “knows” that once upon a time the 
World was pious – that in olden days most 
people exhibited levels of religious practice and 
concern that today linger only in isolated social 
subcultures such as the Amish, ultra­orthodox 
Jews, or Muslim fundamentalists. But, like so 
many once­upon­a­time tales, this conception 
of a pious past is mere nostalgia; most promin­
ent historians of medieval religion now agree 
that there never was an “Age of Faith” (Stark 
1999: 255).
Speaking of the decline of religion is therefore unjus­
tified, as there was no time when religion was faring 
better than it is now. 
The defenders of the secularisation thesis answer 
by stressing that the age of piety means that there 
were times when the social life and culture of a so­
ciety were dominated and characterised by religion, 
and the entire life of a person was controlled by reli­
gious institutions (Bruce 2013: 5). They stress that the 
process of secularisation does not mean the decline 
of religious practices or of religious institutions’ in­
fluence on individual lives, but the disappearance of 
the social functions of religion (Wilson 1981: 207–8; 
Bruce 2002: 58).
Early modernisation – religious decline or revival?
Critics of the secularisation thesis also refer to data 
presenting religion in early modern societies (the end 
of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth 
century) which, in their opinion, contradict the claim 
about the decline of religiosity and weakening of re­
ligious institutions. The data, mostly from the USA, 
showing high levels of affiliation to religious insti­
tutions, mostly Christian, in early modern times, is 
used to prove the argument. It shows that migration 
from villages to cities and urbanisation did not re­
sult in a decline in membership of various Churches, 
which on the contrary managed to successfully mo­
bilise their members, even in industrialised areas 
(Finke 1992: 156; Finke and Stark 1988: 43). 
Hugh McLeod’s (1992) views can be presented 
as a counter­argument to such claims. In his opin­
ion from the end of eighteenth century we can ob­
serve periods of both religious decline and resur­
gence. In the second half of the nineteenth century 
the decline of religion was caused by various factors: 
class conflict between the working, middle and up­
per classes; the development of science; the growing 
affluence of society and the rise of leisure activities. 
However, each of these factors could also initiate the 
resurgence and rise of religious organisations. Those 
processes spread unevenly in society – they had a dif­
ferent impact, time and speed in its various strata and 
locations and therefore the author calls for a more 
nuanced approach.
Pluralism – religious mobilisation or degradation? 
The interpretation of religious pluralism as the fate 
of religion in the modern world is one of the central 
elem ents of the debates on secularisation. Secularisa­
tion theories interpret religious pluralism as a threat 
to the credibility of a religion (Berger 1967, Wilson 
1966). Critics of secularisation offer contrasting in­
terpretations. In their opinion religious pluralism 
is a consequence of deregulation, initiating the free 
religious market (Finke and Stark 1988: 42; Stark 
1992: 262; Stark et al. 1995: 433; Greeley and Hout 
1999: 814). Churches, lacking the support and pro­
tection of the state, depend only on the number and 
involvement of their believers; hence they need to 
make an attractive and appealing offer to their adher­
ents (Finke and Stark 1988: 42; Finke 1990). In this 
view religious pluralism causes religious resurgence 
rather than decline. To support such claims Stark and 
his colleagues use a wide set of data on religious af­
filiation, religious practices and beliefs from different 
parts of the world and different historical periods 
(Iannacone 1991: 156–77; Stark et al. 1995: 191).
Answering these claims, defenders of seculari­
sation theories stress that a distinction needs to be 
made between the presence of religions in someone’s 
surroundings and the real availability of options. Ad­
ditionally, deregulation of the religious market – a 
necessary condition for religious pluralism – may 
be relative. In various regions of the USA one reli­
gious organisation functions informally as a domin­
ant mon opoly and plays a crucial role in the social 
and pol itical life of a given community (Bruce 1992: 
191). Some scholars also challenge the research done 
by Stark and his colleagues. David Voas and his team 
draw attention to the incorrect interpretation of the 
results of the research. In their opinion a positive or 
negative correlation does not reflect dependences, 
but is rather an artefact being a consequence of a 
wrong construction of indicators. Moreover, these 
correlations differ depending on the measures of reli­
giosity (e.g. church affiliation, church attendance). 
They conclude by saying that it may be the case that 
religious pluralism does not have any impact on reli­
gion (Voas et al. 2002: 213–19).
Other authors stress the contextual character 
of the relationship between pluralism and secu­
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larisation. Peter L. Berger aptly comments on this: 
‘[m]odernity pluralises the lifeworlds of individuals 
and consequently undermines all taken­for­granted 
certainties. This pluralisation may or may not be 
secularising, depending on other factors in a given 
situ ation’ (Berger 2001: 449).
USA – exception or rule? 
Religious developments in the United States have 
always posed a challenge to the secularisation thesis 
and often been referred to as an example in refutations 
of its claims (i.e. in terms of its high levels of church 
attendance, of church affiliation and of beliefs in re­
ligious dogmas) (Sherkat and Ellison 1999, Greeley 
and Hout 1999). In response to this, defenders of the 
secularisation thesis point to some problems with the 
way the data has been gathered and show that us­
ing indirect indicators presents a different picture of 
the religious involvement of Americans (Hadaway et 
al. 1993). For example, using such indirect ways of 
measuring religious involvement indicated a decline 
in church attendance (Chaves and Stephens 2003: 
92). Also, the acceptance of the dogmas central to 
the Christian belief system seemed to show a ten­
dency to decline and their influence on individuals’ 
activ ities was rather weak (Gorski 2000: 142; Chaves 
1994: 769). There is a consensus on both sides that 
the USA is, among the most affluent countries, still 
one of the most religious (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 
94). However, the inconsistency of data does not al­
low for unambiguous interpretation, so we need to be 
careful not to offer oversimplified stories about the 
secularisation process or to make excessively hasty 
repudi ations (Chaves and Stephens 2003: 93).
The European religious scene – secularisation or sacralisation?
Theories of secularisation were also challenged by the 
data coming from Western Europe showing that tra­
ditional Churches persistently play an important role 
in politics and policy­making (e.g. the influence of 
the dominant Churches on family or abortion pol icy) 
(Minkenberg 2002), as well as in civil society (e.g. 
they may define what religion is and through this ex­
clude potential competitors) (Knoblauch 2003: 270). 
Research also seems to indicate their influential role 
in shaping the culture of European societies (Casa­
nova 2004; Hervieu­Léger 2001: 125).
Arguments against the secularisation thesis are 
also based on the discrepancy between various indi­
cators measuring individual religiosity; for ex ample 
the drop in religious affiliation on the one hand and 
persistently high levels of belief in God on the other. 
Critics also point to the process of religious individu­
alisation referring to the data showing such phenom­
ena as ‘religion à la carte’, ‘religious bricolage’ or ‘be­
lieving without belonging’.
Refuting arguments regarding the discrepancy 
of the data on religiosity, Pippa Norris and Ronald 
Inglehart stress that the secularisation process can 
neither be confirmed nor rejected by using the data 
gathered over such a short period of time. Their own 
research, collecting and comparing data on religious 
affili ation, church attendance and beliefs in religious 
dogmas gathered in various research projects from 
1947 till 2001, shows a different picture of the dynam­
ics of the European religious scene. In most countries 
data on religious involvement shows a decline, de­
spite periodical fluctuations. The authors conclude 
that ‘(t)rends in recent decades illustrate the consist­
ency of the secularisation process irrespective of the 
particular indicator or survey that is selected’ (Norris 
and Inglehart 2004: 87).
However, most often the defenders of the secu­
larisation thesis stress the multidimensionality of the 
process and lack of a casual relationship between its 
various levels (Dobbelaere 1999: 245). Furthermore, 
they argue that this approach mainly applies to the 
societal level, so the decline or temporary growth of 
religious practices does not necessary mean the ab­
sence of a secularisation process (Wilson 1998: 49). 
In the argument reviewed above, both sides of 
the debate mostly use data on Christian Churches or 
denominations (in the case of the USA). The main 
indicators concern churchgoing, church membership 
and to a lesser extent individual religiosity (i.e. belief 
in God) – the elements constitutive of the Christian 
tradition. So the term ‘religion’, used in general terms, 
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in fact reflects Christianity’s features and functions. 
This claim is further supported by the fact that all 
the arguments are quite ethnocentric – they are geo­
graphically limited to the Euro­American context. 
Contextualising secularisation 
Critics of the secularisation thesis also use data from 
the global religious scene showing that the develop­
ments taking place outside Europe do not confirm 
the predictions of secularisation theories; in particu­
lar claims that wherever modernisation happens it 
is accompanied by secularisation. Berger’s comment 
aptly redefines the relations between the two:
… the world, with some notable exceptions …, 
is as religious as it has ever been, and in some 
places is more religious than ever. This, how ever, 
does not mean that there is no such thing as 
secularisation; it only means that this phenom­
enon is by no means the direct and inevitable 
result of modernity (Berger 2001: 445).
The observations coming from the Middle East, with 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran presented as a primary 
example, were most often used to challenge the link 
between modernisation and secularisation (Hadden 
1987: 606; Berger 1999: 7–8). In various countries 
of that region, secularisation did not emerge along 
with modernisation. On the contrary, modernisation 
initiated the revitalisation of Islam, often in its most 
puritan and fundamental versions (Gellner 1992: 22).
Another example often used to contradict as­
sumptions regarding the link between mod ernity 
and secularisation is the success of conservative Prot­
estantism, particularly in the post­colonial countries 
of Latin America, Sub­Saharan Africa, the Philip­
pines and Southern Asia (China and South Korea 
in particular). Research also shows such success in 
Western European countries (Great Britain, the 
Netherlands and USA) as well as some of the post­
communist countries (e.g. Romania). Conversion to 
Protestantism, as was documented in the context of 
Latin America, often means that religion becomes a 
central value shaping the life of individuals, but also 
the success of those churches initiated a cultural 
transform ation changing attitudes towards work 
and consumption, as well as  creating a new ethos of 
education and a challenge to the traditional macho 
model of masculinity (Berger 1999: 9; Martin 1999: 
37). Based on these observations from around the 
globe Grace Davie suggests adoption of the concept 
of European religious exceptionalism, stressing the 
peculiarity of the European experience in respect to 
the relationship between modernisation and secu­
larisation (Davie 2002). 
As a result of the growing body of evidence, the 
European experiences ceased to serve as a paradigm 
for understanding the relationship between mod­
ernisation and secularisation. In the European con­
text the secularising impact of modernisation was 
strengthened by those elements of European cul­
ture which had their own secularising potential. In 
other cultural contexts the relationship between the 
two may have a radically different effect. Examples 
coming from both the Middle East and the USA are 
the best illustrations of the reverse impact of mod­
ernisation on religion (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 49). 
The concept of multiple modernities (see Eisenstadt 
2000) came to be seen as particularly promising in 
the attempts to grasp the complex relation between 
religion and various versions of modernity (Davie 
2007: 108–109).
Religious innovations
The final body of evidence which critics refer to is 
the data on the widespread existence of new religious 
movements and phenomena connected to spiritual­
ity. New religious movements were at the centre of 
the attention of the authors of religious economy 
theory. In their opinion the emergence of new reli­
gious movements is a natural stage of religious evolu­
tion and in fact a consequence of the secularisation 
process, ‘[w]hen secularisation erodes the power of 
respectable denominations, it leaves the market for 
general compensators first to the familiar intensity of 
sects and then to the novel innovations of cults’ (Stark 
and Bainbridge 1996: 279). Proving their point, the 
authors refer to the data showing a growing number 
of new religious movements in the regions where tra­
ditional religions are weaker. Hence, the emergence 
of new religious movements is a direct effect of the 
secularisation process which, by stimulating religious 
pluralism and religious competition, in fact contrib­
utes to the resurgence of religion. 
Defenders of the secularisation thesis refuting 
this argument interpret the presence of new religious 
movements in a strikingly different way – they stress 
the limited scope of the phenomenon and the lack 
of a wider social impact associated with it (Lechner 
1991: 111; Chaves 1994: 759). Furthermore, for some 
scholars new religious movements present strong 
evidence supporting the secularisation thesis. In this 
context Karel Dobbelaere speaks of secularisation at 
a meso level, which could also be called a religious 
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change. According to this argument the new reli­
gious movements focus on the immanent reality of 
mundanity so they should be perceived as a religious 
adaptation to the secularised world (Dobbelaere 
1999: 235–6). 
Yet another argument against the secularisation 
thesis focuses on the widespread presence of new 
religious forms in late modern Western societies, 
particularly in Europe. There are different labels used 
for these phenomena – new, post­industrial, alterna­
tive types of religion or spirituality (Houtman and 
Mascini 2002: 455). Focusing on this type of religion 
allows us to discover a completely different picture 
of the European religious scene than that described 
by secularisation theory. In fact, the picture which 
emerges presents the religious situation in Europe 
which is much more similar to the religious situation 
around the globe. These new forms of religion/spir­
ituality are a consequence of modernisation which 
did not eliminate the questions about the meaning 
and aim of life, but only altered the subjects provid­
ing these answers. As Danièle Hervieu­Léger stresses, 
‘[t]o the same degree that modernity does not elimin­
ate the question of sense, it quite certainly produces 
belief, but it produces atomised, shattered belief, 
reflecting, in its very crumbling, the reality lived by 
those concerned’ (Hervieu­Léger 1998: 75).
Research in Europe confirms the growing popu­
larity of new religious forms, accompanied by the 
decline in traditional religiosity. Spirituality as a new 
form of religion is non­institutional and at best has 
a form of informal networks. Furthermore, it has a 
very individualised character – such religions are 
chosen or constructed by the individual, according 
to his/her needs and preferences (Knoblauch 2003: 
271; Luckmann 2003: 282). 
Supporters of the secularisation thesis offer a 
contrasting interpretation of the existence of invis­
ible religions. In their opinion the presence of such 
phenomena is proof of the secularisation process. 
New Age/spirituality is ‘the example par excellence 
of this latter possibility: a complex of spiritualities 
which emerges on the foundation of a pluralistic 
secular society’ (Hanegraaff 1999: 151). Addition­
ally, the limited scope of its occurrence as well as the 
lack of its social influence are considered the main 
weaknesses in attempts to use the phenomenon of 
spirituality as an example of a challenge to the secu­
larisation process. Steve Bruce questions the possibil­
ity of the phenomenon of spirituality reversing cur­
rent trends or initiating a wider process of religious 
revitalisation. In this context it is difficult to speak 
about refuting the secularisation thesis as for this, 
in Bruce’s opinion, the societal dimension is central 
(Bruce 2002: 103–5). Resolving the disagreement 
Paul Heelas points to the subjectivisation thesis as 
the explan ation for both the growth of new religious 
forms and the decline of the old ones:
As the assumptions, beliefs, and values of the 
autonomous self oriented toward the subjec­
tive life become more widespread in Western 
cultures, there are progressively fewer tradition­
alists, conformists, or conservatives who are 
willing to remain with places of religious wor­
ship, let alone to start attending. And autono­
mous selves are unlikely to participate in forms 
of worship that require living by an order of 
things not of their own making, rather than by 
something from within their own (not depend­
ent) life. (Heelas 2006: 58)
The last arguments indicate the emerging difference 
in understanding of religion on both sides of the de­
bate. The critics of the secularisation approach refer to 
the data on non­Western religions (i.e. Islam) and the 
highly individualised religious forms characteristic of 
late modern societies. This implies an inclusive un­
derstanding of religion, going beyond the Christian Wilhelm von Kaulbach: Schmetterlinge, c. 1860.
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bias. On the contrary, by stressing the societal loca­
tion and power of religion, defenders of secularisation 
seem to still limit the concept of religion to its Chris­
tian forms, even if they do not explicitly admit it. 
Secularisation – decline of what? 
The debate on secularisation is an interesting case 
study which reveals certain aspects of the under­
standing of religion in the contemporary sociology of 
religion. The presented arguments for and against re­
veal the normative assumptions (often implicit) lying 
behind the dispute and allow the understanding of 
religion to be unpacked in the discussion as a whole. 
The defenders of the secularisation thesis frequently 
stress the social importance and centrality of religion 
in social life in their attempts to refute the arguments 
of the critics. Taking into account the fact that only 
traditional religions have the experience of serving as 
‘sacred canopies’ over the whole or part of a society, it 
seems to suggest that the underlying understanding 
of religion is limited to such occurrences. The data 
used to rebut anti­secularisation arguments confirm 
this – in most cases they are indicators measuring 
beliefs in Christian dogmas and/or practices in the 
European context. Such an understanding of religion 
implies that the new religious movements or ‘invis­
ible religions’ are by definition excluded as evidences 
of religious revitalisation. If this is how religion is un­
derstood, secularisation is in fact about the loss of the 
influence and importance of (Christian) religions. 
The debate shows that the understanding of reli­
gion on the part of the defenders of the secularisation 
thesis is very ethnocentric – it is very much based 
on the European experience of Christian Churches 
in the past holding monopolised and dominant posi­
tions in social life. This experience was unjustifiably 
generalised and universalised. On the contrary, the 
arguments used by the critics of the secularisation 
approach show that their understanding of religion is 
much broader and more inclusive. Not only do they 
refer to data showing the resurgence of religion in the 
global world (particularly Islam), reaching beyond 
the European or Western context, but also to the data 
on new religious movements and new forms of re­
ligion. Clearly, their understanding of religion goes 
beyond concepts equating religion with its Christian 
forms. It seems that the criticism of secularisation 
theory may be interpreted as an attempt to extend the 
boundaries of the concept of religion, but also more 
generally as an attempt to ‘de­Christianise’ and de­
Europeanise the sociology of religion. 
Katarzyna Zielińska is Lecturer at 
the Institute of Sociology of the 
Jagiellonian University. Her aca-
demic interests focus on religion in 
contemporary societies, gender in 
Central Eastern European societies 
and transformations of collective 
identity. She has participated in 
several research projects such as 
‘Religion at the European Parlia-
ment’ (RelEP) and ‘Reconstituting Democracy in Europe’ 
(RECON). Currently she is a leader of the project ‘Religion 
in Polish Politics in the Context of the European Integra-
tion’. Her recent publications include: Collective Identity 
and Democracy in the Enlarging Europe (Peter Lang, 2012, 
co-edited with M. Góra and Z. Mach); Democracy, State 
and Society: European Integration in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Jagiellonian University Press, 2011, co-edited with 
M. Góra). Email: Katarzyna.zielinska(at)uj.edu.pl
References
Bellah, Robert 1967. Civil religion in America. Deadalus: 
Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
96(1), <http://www.robertbellah.com/articles_5.htm> 
(accessed on 12.10.2012).
Berger, Peter L. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a 
Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden City: Double­
day, Anchor Books.
—1974. Some second thoughts on substantive versus 
functional definitions of religion. Journal for the Scien­
tific Study of Religion 13(2) (June): 125–33.
—(ed.) 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent 
Religion and World Politics. Michigan: Wm. B. Eerd­
mans Publishing Company.
—2001. Reflections on the sociology of religion today. 
Sociology of Religion 62(4): 443–54. 
Brown, Callum G. 1992. A revisionist approach to reli­
gious change. In Religion and Modernization: Sociolo­
gists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis, 
ed. Steve Bruce, 31–58. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Bruce, Steve (ed.) 1992. Religion and Modernization: 
Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization 
Thesis. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
—2002. God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford: 
Wiley­Blackwell.
—2011. Defining religion: a practical response. Interna­
tional Review of Sociology 21(1): 107–20. 
—2013. Secularisation: in Defence of an Unfashionable 
Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Casanova, José 1994. Public Religions in the Modern 
World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
—2004. Religion, European secular identities, and Euro­
pean integration. Eurozine, <http://www.eurozine.
com/articles/2004­07­29­casanova­en.html> (ac­
cessed on 12.10.2012).
Chaves, Mark 1994. Secularization as declining religious 
authority. Social Forces 72(3) (March): 749–74. 
34 Approaching Religion • Vol. 3, No. 1 • June 2013 
Chaves, Mark, and Laura Stephens 2003. Church attend­
ance in the United States. In Handbook of the Soci­
ology of Religion, ed. Michele Dillon, 85–95. Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cohn, Werner, and Samuel Z. Klausner 1962. Is religion 
universal? Problems of definition. Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 2(1): 25. 
Crippen, Timothy 1988. Old and new gods in the modern 
world: toward a theory of religious transformation. 
Social Forces 67(2) (December): 316–36.
Davie, Grace 1998. Invisible religion. In Encyclopedia of 
Religion and Society, ed. William H. Swatos and Peter 
Kivisto, 238–9. Walnut Creek, CA: Rowman Altamira.
—2002. Europe: the Exceptional Case. Parameters of Faith 
in the Modern World. London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd Ltd.
—2007. The Sociology of Religion. London: SAGE Publica­
tions Ltd.
Dittes, James E. 1969. Secular religion: dilemma of 
churches and researchers. The H. Paul Douglass lec­
tures of 1968. Review of Religious Research 10(2): 65.
Dobbelaere, Karel 1968. Trend report of the state of the 
sociology of religion: 1965–1966. Social Compass 
15(4) (December): 329–65. 
—1981. Trend report. Secularization: a multi­dimensional 
concept. Current Sociology 29(2) (March): 3–153. 
—1999. Towards an integrated perspective of the pro­
cesses related to the descriptive concept of seculariza­
tion. Sociology of Religion 60(3) (September): 229–47. 
—2000. From religious sociology to sociology of religion: 
towards globalisation? Journal for the Scientific Study 
of Religion 39(4): 433–47.
—2011. The contextualization of definitions of religion. 
International Review of Sociology 21(1) (March): 
191–204. 
—2013. Secularization: in Defence of an Unfashionable 
Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Durkheim, Émile 2001. The Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah 2000. Multiple modernities. 
Daedalus 129: 1–29.
Finke, Roger 1990. Religious deregulation: origins and 
consequences. Journal of Church and State 32(3) 
(July): 609–26. 
—1992. An unsecular America. In Religion and Modern­
ization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secu­
larization Thesis, ed. Steve Bruce, 145–69. Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Finke, Roger, and Rodney Stark 1988. Religious econo­
mies and sacred canopies: religious mobilization in 
American cities, 1906. American Sociological Review 
53(1) (February): 41–9. 
Gellner, Ernest 1992. Postmodernism, Reason and Reli­
gion. London: Routledge.
Goldstein, Warren S. 2009. Secularization patterns in the 
old paradigm. Sociology of Religion 70(2): 157–78. 
Gorski, Philip S. 2000. Historicizing the secularization 
debate: church, state, and society in late medieval 
and early modern Europe, ca 1300 to 1700. American 
Sociological Review 65(1) (February): 138–67. 
Greeley, Andrew M. 1972. Unsecular Man: the Persistence 
of Religion. New York: Schocken Books.
Greeley, Andrew M., and Michael Hout 1999. Americans’ 
increasing belief in life after death: religious competi­
tion and acculturation. American Sociological Review 
64(6) (December): 813–35. 
Hadaway, C. Kirk, Penny Long Marler, and Mark Chaves 
1993. What the polls don’t show: a closer look at U.S. 
church attendance. American Sociological Review 
58(6) (December): 741–52. 
Hadden, Jeffrey K. 1987. Toward desacralizing seculariza­
tion theory. Social Forces 65(3) (March): 587–611. 
doi:10.2307/2578520.
Hanegraaff, Wouter J. 1999. New Age spiritualities as 
secular religion: a historian’s perspective. Social Com­
pass 46(2) (June): 145–60. 
Heelas, Paul 2006. Challenging secularization theory: the 
growth of “New Age” spiritualities of life. Hedgehog 
Review 8(1/2): 46–58.
Hellemans, Staf 1998. Secularization in a religiogeneous 
modernity. In Secularization and Social Integra­
tion: Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbelaere, ed. Rudi 
Laermans, Bryan R. Wilson and Jaak Billiet, 67–79. 
Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Herberg, Will 1962. Religion in a secularized society: the 
new shape of religion in America (Lecture I). Review 
of Religious Research 3(4): 145. 
Hervieu­Léger, Danièle 1998. Secularization, tradition 
and new forms of religiosity: some theoretical pro­
posals. In New Religions and New Religiosity, ed. 
Eileen Barker and Margit Warburg, 28–44. Aarhus: 
Aarhus University Press.
—2001. The twofold limit of the notion of seculariza­
tion. In Peter Berger and the Study of Religion, ed. 
Linda Woodhead, David Martin and Paul Weithman, 
112–25. London: Taylor & Francis.
Houtman, Dick, and Peter Mascini 2002. Why do 
churches become empty, while new age grows? 
Secularization and religious change in the Nether­
lands. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41(3): 
455–73.
Iannacone, Laurence 1991. The consequences of religious 
market structure: Adam Smith and the economics of 
religion. Rationality and Society 3(2): 156–77.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Wayne E. Baker 2000. Moderniza­
tion, cultural change, and the persistence of tradi­
tional values. American Sociological Review 65(1) 
(February): 19–51. 
Knoblauch, Hubert 2003. Europe and invisible religion. 
Social Compass 50(3) (September): 267–74. 
Lechner, Frank J. 1991. The case against secularization:  
a rebuttal. Social Forces 69(4) (June): 1103–19. 
Luckmann, Thomas 1963. On religion in modern soci­
ety: individual consciousness, world view, institu­
tion. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 2(2): 
147–62. 
35Approaching Religion • Vol. 3, No. 1 • June 2013 
—1967. The Invisible Religion: the Problem of Religion 
in Modern Society. London: MacMillan Publishing 
Company.
—1977. Theories of religion and social change. The An­
nual Review of the Social Studies of Religion 1: 1–28.
—2003. Transformations of religion and morality in 
modern Europe. Social Compass 50(3) (September): 
275–85. 
Martin, David 1965. Toward eliminating the concept of 
secularisation. In Penguin Survey of the Social Sci­
ences, ed. Julius Gould, 169–82. Baltimore: Penguin 
Books.
—1999. The Evangelical Protestant upsurge and its 
politic al implication. In The Desecularization of the 
World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, ed. Peter 
L. Berger, 37–50. Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub­
lishing Company.
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels 2008. On Religion. 
Mineola, New York: Dover Publications.
McLeod, Hugh 1992. Secular cities? Berlin, London, and 
New York in the later nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In Religion and Modernization: Sociolo­
gists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis, 
ed. Steve Bruce, 59–89. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Minkenberg, Michael 2002. Religion and public policy. 
Comparative Political Studies 35(2) (March): 221–47. 
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart 2004. Sacred and 
Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Pickel, Gert 2011. Contextual secularization: theoretical 
thoughts and empirical implications. Religion and 
Society in Central and Eastern Europe 4(1): 3–20.
Robertson, Roland 1970. The Sociological Interpretation  
of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell.
Schreuder, O. 1966. Sociologie religieuse et recherche 
socio­ ecclésiastique au cours de la période 1962–
1964. Social Compass 13(3) (September): 205–35. 
Sherkat, Darren E., and Christopher G. Ellison 1999. 
Recent developments and current controversies in 
the sociology of religion. Annual Review of Sociology 
25(1): 363–94. 
Shupe, Anson, and Jeffrey K. Hadden 1998. Is there such 
a thing as global fundamentalism? In Seculariza­
tion and Fundamentalism Reconsidered: Religion and 
the Politic al Order, ed. Anson Shupe and Jeffrey K. 
Hadden , 109–22. New York: Paragon House.
Stark, Rodney 1992. Do Catholic societies really exist? 
Rationality and Society 4(3) (July): 261–71. 
—1999. Secularization, R.I.P. Sociology of Religion 60(3): 
249–73. 
Stark, Rodney, and William Sims Bainbridge 1980. 
Towards a theory of religion: religious commitment. 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 19(2): 114.
—1981. Secularization and cult formation in the Jazz 
age. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 20(4): 
360–73. 
—1996. A Theory of Religion, reprint. New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press.
Stark, Rodney, R. Finke, and R. Lawrence 1995. Pluralism 
and piety: England and Wales, 1851. Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 36: 431–44.
Swatos, William H., and Kevin J. Christiano 1999. Secu­
larization theory: the course of a concept. Sociology of 
Religion 60(3): 209–28. 
Turner, Bryan S. (eds) 2010. Secularization. 4 vols. Lon­
don: SAGE Publications Ltd.
Voas, David, Alasdair Crockett, and Daniel V. A. Olson 
2002. Religious pluralism and participation: why pre­
vious research is wrong. American Sociological Review 
67(2): 212–30. 
Voyé, Liliane 2004. A survey of advance in the sociology 
of religion (1980–2000). In New Approaches to the 
Study of Religion: Textual, Comparative, Sociological, 
and Cognitive Approaches, ed. Peter Antes, Armin W. 
Geertz and Randi R. Warne, 195–228. Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter.
Warner, Rob 2010. Secularization and Its Discontents. 
London and New York: Continuum International 
Publishing Group.
Warner, R. Stephen 1993. Work in progress toward a new 
paradigm for the sociological study of religion in the 
United States. American Journal of Sociology 98(5) 
(March): 1044–93.
Weber, Max 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press.
Weigert, Andrew J. 1974. Functional, substantive, or 
political? A comment on Berger’s ‘Second Thoughts 
on Defining Religion’. Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 13(4) (December): 483–6. 
Wilson, Bryan 1966. Religion in Secular Society: a Socio­
logical Comment. London: Watts.
—1981. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press.
—1998. The secularization thesis: criticisms and rebut­
tals. In Secularization and Social Integration: Papers 
in Honor of Karel Dobbelaere, ed. Rudi Laermans, 
Bryan Wilson, and Jaak Billiet, 45–65. Leuven: Leuven 
University Press.
